Device Signing Verifier node

Verifies possession of a registered bound device.

What are the differences between device binding/signing and WebAuthn?

There are many similarities between WebAuthn and device binding and JWS verification. We provide authentication nodes to implement both technologies in your journeys.

Both can be used for usernameless and passwordless authentication, they both use public key cryptography, and both can be used as part of a multi-factor authentication journey.

One major difference is that with device binding, the private key never leaves the device.

With WebAuthn, there is a possibility that the private key is synchronized across client devices because of Passkey support, which may be undesirable for your organization.

For details of the differences, refer to the following table:

Comparison of WebAuthn and Device Binding/JWS Verification
Feature	WebAuthn / FIDO	Device Binding / JWS Verifier	Details
Industry-standards based	✅	❌	You can refer to the WebAuthn W3C specification. Device binding and JWS verification are proprietary implementations.
Public key cryptography	✅	✅	Both methods use Public key cryptography.
Usernameless support	✅	✅	After registration, the username can be stored in the device and obtained during authentication without the user having to enter their credentials.
Keys are bound to the device	❌	✅	With WebAuthn, if Passkeys are used, they can be shared across devices. With device binding, the private keys do not leave the device.
Sign custom data	❌	✅	With device binding, you can: Customize the challenge that the device must sign. For example, you could include details of a transaction, such as the amount in dollars. Add custom claims to the payload when signing a challenge. This gives additional context that the server can make use of by using a scripted node. Refer to Add custom claims when signing.
Format of signed data	WebAuthn authenticator data	JSON Web Signature (JWS)
Integration	❌	✅	With device binding, after verification, the signed JWT is available in: Audit Logs Transient node state This enables the data within to be used for integration into your processes and business logic.
Platform support	✅ Android ✅ iOS ✅ Web browsers	✅ Android ✅ iOS ❌ Web browsers	As it is challenging to store secure data in a browser as a client app, device binding is not supported in web browsers.
Authenticator support	Determined by the platform. Configuration limited to: Biometric with Fallback to Device Pin	Determined by the authentication node. Full configuration options: Biometric Authentication Biometric with Fallback to Device Pin Application Pin Silent	With device binding, you can specify what authentication action the user must perform to get access to the private keys. This provides greater flexibility in your security implementation and can reduce authentication friction for your users.
Key storage	Web browsers and iOS synchronize to the cloud. Android has the option to synchronize to the cloud.	Android KeyStore iOS Secure enclave: hardware-backed and not synchronized to the cloud.	Both technologies store the private keys securely on the client. WebAuthn supports synchronizing the private keys to the cloud for use on other devices. This can reduce authentication friction for your users but may also increase the risk of a breach.
Managing device keys	Managed by the device OS. Apps cannot delete local client keys programmatically and do not have a reference to the remote server key for deletion.	Managed by the Ping SDKs. Provides an interface to delete local client and remote server keys.	The ability to programmatically delete both client and server keys can greatly simplify the process of registering a new device if an old device is lost or stolen.
Passkey support	✅	❌	WebAuthn supports synchronizing the private keys to the cloud for use on other devices. Device binding keeps the private key locked in the device.
App integrity verification	Android Requires an `assetlinks.json` file. iOS Requires `apple-app-site-association` file.	Not provided by the device binding or verification nodes. It can be added as part of the journey by using app integrity nodes.	App integrity verification helps ensure your users are only using a supported app rather than a third-party or potentially malicious version.
Key attestation	Android SafetyNet iOS None	Android Uses hardware-backed key pairs with Key Attestation. iOS It can be added as part of the journey by using app integrity nodes to support key attestation.	Key attestation verifies that the private key is valid and correct, is not forged, and was not created in an insecure manner.
Complexity	Medium	Low	WebAuthn requires a bit more configuration, for example, creating and uploading the `assetlinks.json` and `apple-app-site-association` files. Device binding only requires the journey and the SDK built into your app.

The node requires the device to sign a challenge string using the private key that corresponds to a stored public key.

The user might need to unlock their cryptography keys with biometric security — such as a fingerprint — or a PIN.

This node can be used in usernameless authentication flows.

The Ping SDKs store and provide the identity when handling the callbacks from this node. If the device has been registered by more than one user, the SDK displays a list of the registered keys to choose from on the client device.

Compatibility

Product	Compatible?
PingOne Advanced Identity Cloud	Yes
PingAM (self-managed)	Yes
Ping Identity Platform (self-managed)	Yes

Product

Compatible?

PingOne Advanced Identity Cloud

Yes

PingAM (self-managed)

Yes

Ping Identity Platform (self-managed)

Yes

Inputs

If you want the device to sign a custom challenge, its value must be available in shared state. Enter the variable name in the Shared state attribute for Challenge property.

Dependencies

This node requires that you have bound devices by using the Device Binding node.

Configuration

Property Usage

Property	Usage
Sign Random Challenge	Use a random value as the challenge for signing.
Shared state attribute for Challenge	Use the value from the named attribute in shared state as the challenge for signing.
Application IDs	A list of Android package names and iOS bundle IDs of applications allowed to perform device signing verification. For example, `com.example.app`.
Title	A title to display to the user when asking them to bind the device.
Sub Title	A secondary or subtitle to display to the user when asking them to bind the device.
Description	Descriptive text displayed to the user when asking them to bind the device.
Capture Failure	When enabled, adds the reason for a failure to the shared node state variable `DeviceSigningVerifierNode.FAILURE` and continues evaluation along the "Failure" outcome. If not enabled, the journey halts with an exception, and the journey does not continue along an outcome path. Reasons for failure include: `INVALID_CLAIM` Failed to validate one or more claims presented in the token. For example, the challenge claim did not match the value set in the node configuration, or the issuer (`ISS`) claim did not match a value in the Application IDs list. `INVALID_SIGNATURE` Failed to validate the token signature. `INVALID_USER` Account does not exist. `NOT_ACTIVE_USER` Account is not active or locked out. `INVALID_SUBJECT` Failed to validate the token subject.
Timeout	Specify the number of seconds to wait for a response from the client during binding. If the specified time is reached, evaluation continues along the `Timeout` outcome path.

Sign Random Challenge

Use a random value as the challenge for signing.

Shared state attribute for Challenge

Use the value from the named attribute in shared state as the challenge for signing.

Application IDs

A list of Android package names and iOS bundle IDs of applications allowed to perform device signing verification.

For example, com.example.app.

Title

A title to display to the user when asking them to bind the device.

Sub Title

A secondary or subtitle to display to the user when asking them to bind the device.

Description

Descriptive text displayed to the user when asking them to bind the device.

Capture Failure

When enabled, adds the reason for a failure to the shared node state variable DeviceSigningVerifierNode.FAILURE and continues evaluation along the "Failure" outcome.

If not enabled, the journey halts with an exception, and the journey does not continue along an outcome path.

Reasons for failure include:

INVALID_CLAIM: Failed to validate one or more claims presented in the token.

For example, the challenge claim did not match the value set in the node configuration, or the issuer (ISS) claim did not match a value in the Application IDs list.
INVALID_SIGNATURE: Failed to validate the token signature.
INVALID_USER: Account does not exist.
NOT_ACTIVE_USER: Account is not active or locked out.
INVALID_SUBJECT: Failed to validate the token subject.

Timeout

Specify the number of seconds to wait for a response from the client during binding.

If the specified time is reached, evaluation continues along the Timeout outcome path.

Outputs

If you enable the Capture Failure property, the node outputs a failure reason string in a variable named DeviceSigningVerifierNode.FAILURE.

Outcomes

Success
Failure
No Registered Device
Key Not Found
Unsupported (Client)
Abort (Client)
Timeout (Client)
ClientNotRegistered (Client)

If the response from the device is verified as coming from a bound device, evaluation continues along the Success outcome path.

If AM cannot verify that the response was signed by a bound device, evaluation continues along the Failure outcome path.

If the user does not have any bound devices, evaluation continues along the No Registered Device outcome path. The user is determined either previously in the authentication journey, or by reading the sub claim from the response when doing usernameless flows.

If the client device cannot access the cryptography keys, or the key ID that AM requested cannot be located, evaluation continues along the relevant Key Not Found outcome path.

If the user’s client does not support the requested operation, evaluation continues along the Unsupported outcome path.

If the user cancels authentication, evaluation continues along the Abort outcome path.

If the node does not receive a response from the user’s device within the Timeout specified in the node configuration, evaluation continues along the Timeout outcome path.

If the client device does not have the keys present to be able to sign the challenge, evaluation continues along the ClientNotRegistered outcome path.

PingAM 8.0.0